A reckoning of sorts

One might think the press would be incensed. Joseph C. Wilson IV was a media darling in 2003. When Iraqi WMDs were unexpectedly scarce, Wilson was the Bush-bashing know-it-all with 20-20 hindsight who claimed to have warned the administration that no, the Iraqis had not been uranium-shopping in Africa. Bush caught hell in the press over these "16 words" in his 2003 State of the Union:

''The British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently
sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa."

The British, it was later alleged, had relied on faked documents in reaching this conclusion. And then Robert Novak wrote that Wilson's wife (Valerie Plame) worked for the CIA, precipitating an investigation (still going) into who leaked that tidbit to Novak, and much argument as to whether that leak was in fact illegal. Wilson cried foul to every media outlet he could (Washington Post, Meet the Press, etc.), saying the leak was retaliation against him.

It was never clear to me just how leaking the fact that Plame works for the CIA, in and of itself, would be retaliation. How did that hurt Wilson at all? Unless it turned out to be true that Wilson's trip was entirely a family affair, suggested by Plame, supported by Plame, so that Wilson could return with some politically slanted conclusions to report.

But now the Senate has released its Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community's Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. While it's not particularly flattering of some of CIA's work, it's a disaster for Joe Wilson's credibility. Take for example his flat-out statement in his book about whether Plame had recommended him for the Niger trip: "Valerie had nothing to do with the matter," and "She definitely had not proposed that I make the trip." Utterly disproven, by a memo authored by Valerie herself to the head of the Counterproliferation Division in which she writes, "[M]y husband has good relations with both the PM and the former Minister of Mines (not to mention lots of French contacts), both of whom could possibly shed light on this sort of activity."

What of Wilson's findings from his eight days in Niger, after which he "largely discounted the notion" that Iraq had tried to buy uranium there?

"It did not take long to conclude that it was highly doubtful that any such transaction had ever taken place." (Joe Wilson, July 2003)

A subsequent British parliamentary investigation in September 2003 found that British intelligence was justified in its claim that Saddam was uranium-shopping in Niger. British intelligence still stands by their claim on the basis of their own intelligence resources. The forged documents (found to have originated in Rome) were never actually the basis for the British intel, as some have claimed. This latter point is buttressed by the just-released Lord Butler report, which notes:

We conclude that, on the basis of the intelligence assessments at the time, covering both Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the statements on Iraqi attempts to buy uranium from Africa in the government's dossier, and by extension the prime minister in the House of Commons, were well founded. By extension, we conclude also that the statement in President Bush's state of the union address of 2003 that "the British government has learned that Saddam Hussein recently sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa" was well founded.

The New York Times further noted, "[T]he report backed the government's claim that it had intelligence that Iraq had sought uranium in Africa, and that the claim was not based on forged documents." Additionally, other intelligence agencies (the French, for example) reached the same conclusions independently. The Financial Times piles on:

"European intelligence officers have now revealed that three years before the fake documents became public, human and electronic intelligence sources from a number of countries picked up repeated discussion of an illicit trade in uranium from Niger. One of the customers discussed by the traders was Iraq."

The Senate turned up some other information harmful to Wilson's thesis. For example, the Senate report notes that while Wilson was in Niger, he met with former Prime Minister Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, who told Wilson that he believed the Iraqis had tried for a uranium deal in 1999. Naturally, Wilson hadn't brought this up in his press pieces such as his New York Times op-ed where he took the opportunity to accuse the Administration of "twisting", "manipulating", and "exaggerating" intelligence.

Wilson's protestations over the exposure of his wife should also be taken with a grain of salt. Timothy Noah on Slate has already done a pretty good takedown of the couple's progression from supposed victimhood into preening camera-seekers.

Back to my first sentence: one might think the press would be incensed. All these months, Joe Wilson has duped journalist after journalist with his half-truths and red herrings. Wilson has milked them for free publicity for his book and a flattering profile in Vanity Fair. As the press might complain in other circumstances, they were misled by a government official in an important matter of national security. Where, then, is the outrage? Well the press almost always loves a whistleblower, right? Whistleblowers supply ready-made stories to the media complete with predetermined heroes, villains, and conflict. Only those whistleblowers who attack a favorite of the elite risk rough treatment (e.g. Linda Tripp).

As for the auxiliary story, is blowing Plame's cover - if indeed she was ever undercover and not simply a Langley desk-jockey - now excusable? I don't think so, at least not according to what I now know. But I can't see how anybody can accept her as some sort of political martyr anymore.

Maybe the Fertel Foundation would like to take back their prize for Truth-Telling as well.